A network observer on the same Wi-Fi
Sees TLS to Livara and nothing else. No message content, direct or group.
HeldTHREAT MODEL / PUBLISHED IN FULL
Who seeswhat.
A threat model that only lists strengths is a brochure. This one names six adversaries, says exactly what each of them gets, and then prints the list of things Livara does not claim.
Six people who might want your messages
Named, and answered.
Two of these six get more than you might hope. They are listed anyway, in the same type size as the rest.
Livara's own server or someone who takes it
Reads group and channel content, and all routing metadata. Cannot open direct-message bodies or media.
Not heldSomeone who steals your password
Cannot restore your direct-chat keys — the encrypted backup needs the recovery phrase as well.
HeldSomeone holding your unlocked phone
Reads everything you can read. No messenger survives this one.
Not heldA future quantum computer with recorded traffic
Direct-message content stays sealed: ML-KEM-768 is mixed into every message key. Group content does not benefit.
HeldA tampered download served by a middlebox
Detectable before install. The SHA-256 is published and the Proof Lab hashes your file locally.
HeldThe same table, everywhere on this site
Direct is sealed. Groups are not.
This table is printed identically on the home page, on the security page and here, because the answer should not depend on which page you landed on.
07
Seven rows, no shading.
Direct content closes before the network sees it. Group content stays useful for moderation and membership changes, which also means the server can read it.
The cryptographic detail ↗| What it is | Direct 1:1 | Groups & channels |
|---|---|---|
| Message text | Sealed on your device | Server can read it |
| Photos, video, files | Encrypted before upload | Server can read them |
| Captions and edits | Sealed on your device | Server can read them |
| Who you talked to | Server knows | Server knows |
| When you talked | Server knows | Server knows |
| Your password | Never leaves your device | Never leaves your device |
| Your private keys | Never leave your device | Never leave your device |
The list nobody publishes
Six things we are not telling you
Each of these is a real limitation with a real consequence. They are here because a boundary you can only discover by being disappointed is not a boundary, it is a trap.
Livara does not hide metadata
The platform stores who talked to whom, when, in what conversation, and the delivery state of each message. That is how a second device catches up. Any messenger that claims to hide this while also offering instant multi-device sync is worth a second look.
Livara does not end-to-end encrypt groups or channels
Group and channel content is protected in transit and by server-side membership and role checks, and is readable by the server. It is never described as end-to-end encrypted anywhere on this site.
Livara does not end-to-end encrypt call media
Calls are protected in transit. The post-quantum hybrid claim covers direct-message content only.
Livara cannot protect a compromised device
Keys live on the device. Malware with your unlocked device has your plaintext, and no protocol choice on our side changes that.
Livara cannot recover a lost recovery phrase
Lose the device and the phrase together and the old direct-chat ciphertext stays closed permanently. That is the real price of a server that cannot read your messages.
Livara does not claim a formal external audit
There is no third-party audit report to point at yet. Instead of implying one, the site ships the Proof Lab so the parts that are checkable can be checked by you today.
Do not take this page on faith either
The checkable half is checkable now.
Hash the APK, run the handshake, corrupt a byte and watch the authentication reject it. All of it offline, in your own browser, before you install anything.